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On February 27, 1998, the Supreme Court of Virginia ren-
dered its decision in Town of Madison v. Ford.' The court in-
validated a town zoning ordinance which had been enacted in
1972. This extreme result was due to an insufficiency in the
town council's minutes at the meeting when the ordinance in
question was enacted. The minutes did not state the names of
all the members present nor how they voted. The court, there-
fore, found that the ordinance was enacted in derogation of the
provisions of article VII, section 7 of the Constitution of Virgin-
ia ("section 7").2
Section 7, which addresses the recordation of final votes to
enact local ordinances, was interpreted previously at the state
level on two occasions by the Attorney General's office, shortly
after the 1971 constitutional revision.3 Unfortunately, those
opinions were faulty, and local governments which have relied
* Mark J. Yeager, Esquire, Sole Practitioner, Fairfax, Virginia. B.S., 1969, Uni-
versity of Oregon; M.B.A., 1973, Adelphi University; J.D., 1978, George Mason Uni-
versity. He was counsel for the defense in the case of Commissioner v. Adams, 40 Va.
Cir. 38 (Fairfax County 1995), the case upon which the trial court relied in Town of
Madison v. Ford.
1. 255 Va. 429, 498 S.E.2d 235 (1998). Senior Justice Whiting wrote the majority
opinion and was joined by Justices Hassell, Keenan, and Koontz. Justice Compton
wrote the dissent which was joined by Chief Justice Carrico and Justice Lacy.
2. The current version of the Constitution was proposed by S.J. Res. 23, Va.
Gen. Assembly (Ex. Sess. 1969). The resolution was referred to the 1970 Session
where it was again agreed upon by H.J. Res. 13, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
1970). The resolution was ratified by the people on November 3, 1970 and is often
referred to as the 1971 Constitution because it did not take effect until the following
year. The text of Article VII, section 7 is set forth in full at infra Section I.
3. See 1972 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 43; 1974 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 84.
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on them will find that the Ford decision represents a rude
awakening. Local ordinances of every sort, dating back to 1971,
now are susceptible to attack for being null and void.
This article examines the issues raised by the Ford decision
and acquaints the reader with section 7 and its genesis. More
specifically, it examines whether the language of section 7 re-
quires local legislative bodies to enact their ordinances by roll
call vote, an issue left in doubt by the Ford opinion. Because
most Virginia practitioners have at least some dealings that are
affected by the ordinances of towns, cities and counties, this
treatment hopefully will serve as a primer for those who were
unfamiliar, until now, with the deceivingly simple provisions of
section 7.
Section II of this article examines the facts and the holding
of the Ford decision. Section III attempts to provide insight to
the legislative intent that prompted the inclusion of section 7
into the 1971 constitution. Section IV raises and answers some
of the questions related to roll call voting and other issues
which remain in the wake of Ford. Due to the paucity of Vir-
ginia case law on the subject, this examination begins with the
seminal case of Steckert v. City of East Saginaw,4 which the
Ford court relied upon in deciding Ford.
This article concludes that, notwithstanding a vigorous dis-
sent, the Ford decision was decided correctly and that the mini-
mal requirements of section 7 demand that local legislative
bodies record the passage of ordinances either by roll call vote
or a functional equivalent thereof.
II. THE FORD DECISION
In 1996, the Town of Madison filed suit to enjoin Carol Ford
from operating two businesses on a parcel of land zoned "Resi-
dential, R-1." Using the land for business purposes violated the
town's zoning ordinance. Ford, in return, filed a "special plea"
seeking dismissal of the suit on the grounds that the 1972
ordinance had not been enacted by a "roll call" vote.' In sup-
4. 22 Mich. 104 (1870).
5. See Ford, 255 Va. at 437, 498 S.E.2d at 239 (Compton, J., dissenting). Roll
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port of her position, she relied on article VII, section 7 of the
Constitution of Virginia which states:
No ordinance or resolution appropriating money exceed-
ing the sum of five hundred dollars, imposing taxes, or
authorizing the borrowing of money shall be passed except
by a recorded affirmative vote of a majority of all members
elected to the governing body. In the case of the veto of
such an ordinance or resolution, where the power of veto
exists, it shall require therefore a recorded affimative vote
of two-thirds of all members elected to the governing body.
On final vote on any ordinance or resolution, the name of
each member voting and how he voted shall be recorded.'
Based upon Ford's special plea, the trial court held an ore
tenus hearing and considered the following to be pertinent min-
utes of the town council's special meeting on October 25, 1972:
Town Council held a special meeting on the above date
following the joint hearing of the Planning Commission and
the Council. All members were present ...
Council was informed by the Planning Commission that
they [sic] have approved the Zoning Ordnance [sic] ....
Councilman Drake moved that the Town Council accept the
Ordnance [sic] as presented by the Commission. Motion
seconded by Councilwoman Johnston and carried unani-
mously."
Because these minutes did not indicate the names of all the
members present, the use of the term, "all members were pres-
ent," was problematic. In an attempt to remedy this omission,
the town introduced its records from 1971, which indicated that
each named member of the Madison Town Council had given
the oath of office administered by the incumbent circuit judge.
Additionally, the town submitted the council minutes from its
most recent "regular monthly meeting" held on October 9, 1972,
demonstrating that the same five council members still held
office when the ordinance passed.8
call voting is a voting procedure whereby council members are called on by name and
allowed either to cast their vote or to abstain.
6. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 7.
7. Ford, 255 Va. at 431, 498 S.E.2d. at 236.
8. See id. at 437, 498 S.E.2d at 239 (Compton, J., dissenting).
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The trial court, in its written opinion,9 ruled that only one of
the documents was relevant-the minutes of the October 25,
1972, special meeting which enacted the ordinance." Because
these minutes did not record the name of each member voting
nor how they voted, the trial court ruled that this violated the
mandates of section 7 and held that the ordinance was void ab
initio." The town appealed this decision to the Supreme Court
of Virginia.
Both at the trial court level and in the supreme court, the
town argued, as a threshold matter, that the provisions of the
second paragraph of section 7 applied only to the fiscal ordi-
nances referred to in the first paragraph. 12 This argument was
promptly dismissed by the court, which stated that "the express
terms of the second paragraph make its provisions clearly appli-
cable to all ordinances, not just those ordinances referred to ih
the first paragraph." 3 The town's main argument, however,
required more detailed analysis.
The town contended that the ordinance was valid and in
compliance with section 7 inasmuch as the minutes reflected
that, "all members were present when the meeting began and
that the resolution was passed unanimously." 4
From the town's point of view, there could be "no doubt as to
how each member voted." 5 The town records clearly estab-
lished the identity of the council members. Thus, when the
town voted unanimously to pass the ordinance, it became a
matter of deductive reasoning to determine the names of each
member voting and how they voted. According to the town's
argument, the method of voting, at the very least, was substan-
tially in compliance with section 7.16
In contrast to the town's position, Ford argued that the
names of the members present and how they voted could not be
9. See Town of Madison v. Ford, 40 Va. Cir. 423 (Madison County 1996).
10. See Ford, 255 Va. at 437, 498 S.E.2d at 239.
11. See id. at 438, 498 S.E.2d at 239.
12. See id. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236.
13. Id. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236.
14. Id. Actually, the matter in question was an ordinance and not a resolution.
15. Id. at 433, 498 S.E.2d at 236.
16. See id. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 237.
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found on the face of the minutes. Accordingly, the requirements
of section 7 were not met.17
As it began its analysis, the supreme court reiterated that
the Constitution of Virginia is a charter; 8 therefore, it is the
fundamental law in Virginia. 9 Further, the constitution is a
restriction of governmental power". Although the town had
the power to enact zoning ordinances, it could do so only by
following the mandate of section 721
As the court continued its analysis, it chose to decide the
issue on the narrowest of grounds by asserting that if a consti-
tutional provision is "plain and unambiguous," the court need
not "construe it, but apply it as written."22 This decision was
unfortunate, especially given the four-to-three split among the
justices. As will be seen, the language of section 7 is not as
"plain and unamliguous" as the court asserts.
Supporting its position that the town had complied substan-
tially with the requirements of section 7, the court cited the
opinion of the Attorney General to the Honorable William B.
McClung, dated September 2, 1971' (two months after the ef-
fective date of the 1971 version of the Constitution of Virginia).
In that opinion, the Attorney General cited the second para-
graph of section 7 and then quoted from McClung's letter, in
order to pose the following issue:
Whether or not the recorded vote of each individual
member of the Board of Supervisors is necessary when a
motion is either passed or rejected upon the unanimous
action of the members of the Board at their regular meeting
after there having been recorded in the Minutes of the
Meeting the members that are present.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236 (citing Coleman v. Pross, 219 Va. 143, 152,
246 S.E.2d 613, 618 (1978)); see also Dean v. Paolicelli, 194 Va. 219, 226, 72 S.E.2d
506, 510-11 (1952); Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 338, 350, 32 S.E.2d 129, 133 (1944).
19. See Ford, 255 Va. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236 (citing Terry v. Mazur, 234 Va.
442, 449, 362 S.E.2d 904, 908 (1987)).
20. See Ford, 255 Va. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236; Dean, 194 Va. at 226, 72 S.E.2d
at 510-11; Mumpower v. Housing Auth., 176 Va. 426, 455, 11 S.E.2d 732, 739 (1940).
21. See Ford, 255 Va. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236; Town of South Hill v. Allen,
177 Va. 154, 159, 12 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1941).
22. Ford, 255 Va. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236.
23. 1972 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 42.
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The Board takes the position that on unanimous deci-
sions after it has been recorded the members that are pres-
ent and the members that are absent, that there is no
question as to which members voted which way. This would
certainly be a time saving device for the meetings rather
than have each individual member that is present say that
he either voted for or against a particular resolution.
An example of what I am referring to would be the situa-
tion where a resolution was made, seconded, and then
unanimously passed by the Board after a voice vote' in
which all the members responded affirmatively. Thus the
record would show that all of those members, including the
Chairman, who were present had voted for the particular
action.'
Although the above cited "question" was not cited by the
supreme court in the Ford decision, it is important to do so
here because the Attorney General's response cannot be under-
stood outside the context of that question. The question to the
Attorney General assumed that all members would be recorded
at the beginning of a Board meeting. The question also as-
sumed that those same members would remain present until
the particular ordinance in question was put to a vote. Most
importantly, it assumed that all members would vote (i.e., sig-
nify their position as opposed to, abstaining on. the record, or
merely remaining silent). Finally, the question illustrated the
misconception that the term "unanimous" " means that every-one voted the same way.
Notwithstanding the problems inherent in the question, the
Attorney General responded as follows:
The part of Section 7, Article VII, of the Constitution
above quoted is new language. It requires the recording of
the names of members of a governing body and how they
voted on any final action taken by the governing body.
24. A voice or viva voce vote is one in which there is a call for all those in favor
to say "aye" and those opposed to say "no". The chair then determines from what he
hears, which side has more votes. See Shalersville Bd. of Educ. v. Homer, 9 N.E.2d
918, 921 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936).
25. 1972 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 42-43 (emphasis added) (footnote added).
26. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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In applying this provision to your inquiry, I am of the
opinion that the recorded vote of each individual member of
the board is not necessary when a motion is either passed
or rejected upon the unanimous action of the members at
their regular meeting after there has been a recording in
the minutes of the meeting of the members who are pres-
ent. In such circumstances the names of the members and
how they voted is recordedY
After citing the second paragraph of the Attorney General's
response, the supreme court in Ford merely held that this opin-
ion did not support the town's position." Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Whiting, stated:
Although suggesting a formal roll call vote is not neces-
sary, the opinion is clearly predicated on the assumption
that "there has been a recording in the minutes of the
members who are present." In the minutes at issue, the
names of only three of the four council memberse are stat-
ed. Additionally, for the reasons articulated later, the nota-
tion in the minutes that "the motion... carried
unanimously" does not necessarily indicate that each of
those council members voted in favor of the motion."
This analysis of the Attorney General's Opinion is somewhat
incomplete, however. The court's comments merely distinguish,
the opinion from the facts in Ford by observing that, in his
opinion, the Attorney General assumed that there was a record
of those present. The court did not address, in this analysis,
whether the term "members who are present" referred to the
beginning of the meeting, as implied by Mr. McClung's letter,
or whether it referred to the point in time when the vote was
taken; this distinction is important."' Perhaps, however, of
greater importance is what the court failed to say about the
Attorney General's opinion.
This opinion, issued only a few months after the effective
date of the 1971 constitutional revision, was the only official
27. 1972 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 43.
28. See Ford, 255 Va. at 429, 498 S.E.2d at 235.
29. The fifth member was the mayor.
30. Ford, 255 Va. at 433, 498 S.E.2d at 237 (footnote added).
31. See generally Steckert v. City of East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104 (1870).
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interpretation of section 7 until the mid 1990s. 2 When the
first published circuit court opinions on this topic arose in 1995,
the local governments relied almost solely on this Attorney
General's opinion in every case." Indeed, the opinion even was
cited, without comment, in Professor A.E. Dick Howard's trea-
tise, Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia.' There
simply is no way of reckoning the number of local jurisdictions
which relied upon this opinion in enacting their ordinances. The
Ford decision will not be the last case to interpret section 7 in
this context.
After disposing of the Attorney General's opinion, the.court in
Ford examined the three cases cited in support of the town's
position: (i) Goodyear Rubber Co. v. City of Eureka,5 a Califor-
nia case in which the minutes naming the councilmen present
recorded the vote by stating that all present voted in favor of
the resolution; (ii) Brophy v. Hyatt,"s a Colorado case .wherein
the vote on the measure reflected the names of six members
voting in favor with none opposed; and (iii) Hammon v.
Dixon, 7 where the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld an ordi-
nance that named the members of the council and noted that
the named members present all voted in favor of the ordinance.
The court easily was able to distinguish these three cases from
32. See, e.g., City of Fairfax v. Rose, No. 121438 (Fairfax County May 24, 1993)
(invalidating a DWI ordinance on the basis of its non-compliance with section 7 when
minutes named council members present at inception of meeting, ordinance was
passed "unanimously"); Commonwealth v. Nugent, No. M087840 (Fairfax County May
8, 1995) (invalidating a similar Fairfax County ordinance).
33. In Commonwealth v. Payne, 36 Va. Cir. 227 (Fairfax County 1995), a circuit
court judge upheld the validity of the same ordinance which had been invalidated in
Rose, by relying solely upon the Attorney General's opinion. The first published opin-
ion which examined the legislative history of section 7 and found that there was a
requirement for roll call voting was Judge Arthur B. Vieregg's opinion in the case of
Commonwealth v. Adams, 40 Va. Cir. 38 (Fairfax County 1995) (minutes reflected
that all ten members of the Board were present at the beginning of the meeting and
motion to enact ordinance was passed "by a vote of 7" but three members were out
of the room at the time of the vote). Subsequently, a second published circuit court
opinion was decided, citing Judge Vieregg's opinion with approval. See Commonwealth
v. Jordan, 40 Va. Cir. 87, 91 (Rappahannock County 1995) (minutes reflect passage
"unanimously").
34. 2 A.E. HowARD, COmMENTARES ON THE CONSTrrUON OF VIGINIA 847 n.10
(1974).
35. 67 P. 1043 (Cal. 1902).
36. 15 P. 399 (Colo. 1887).
37. 338 S.W.2d 941 (Ark. 1960).
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the instant case. Unlike the situation in Ford, each of the three
cases involved a record which indicated clearly the names of
those members present at the time of the vote. The court, how-
ever, did not discuss whether the facts in these cases would
pass muster under section 7. Nevertheless, on the question of
what recording is necessary to establish the names of each
member voting, the Supreme Court of Virginia made one point
specifically clear-the names of the members comprising the
legislative body may not be inferred from records not related to
the ordinance in question,"8 but, rather, must be contained in
the records relating to the ordinance itself.9
The interpretation of section 7 that requires the recordation
of the members present at the time of the vote is well founded
in law and common experience throughout the country. Indeed,
the town cited no case in which this type of recordation was
absent. This result is not surprising because strict recordation
requirements, at least when dealing with the passage of local
ordinances, have been recognized consistently since 1870, with
Justice Cooley's opinion for the Supreme Court of Michigan in
Steckert v. City of East Saginaw.4" More than a century later,
Judge Cooley's analysis reappeared in the supreme court's anal-
ysis in Ford which was cited at length:
Now if it were a legal presumption that all the members
who were present at the call to order of such a meeting
remained until its adjournment, and that no others came in
and took their seats afterwards, and if it were also a pre-
38. Dissenting in Ford, Justice Compton, argued that the other documents admit-
ted into evidence at trial were sufficient to establish the names of the members of"
the town council. Indeed, the dissent stated that, "the constitutional provision no-
-where specifies that only the minutes of the meeting in issue may be considered to
sustain the ordinance." Ford, 255 Va. at 439, 498 S.E.2d at 240 (Compton, J., dis-
senting).
39. Replying to the dissent, Justice Whiting observed that:
[tihe dissent reads this constitutional provision as permitting evidence of
"the names of each member voting and how he voted" to be gleaned from
other unrelated documents, at least one of which was prepared in the
year before the council allegedly adopted the ordinance. We think that
the constitutional provision clearly requires that this information be re-
corded either in the minutes adopting the ordinance or in some contem-
poraneous document referencing the adoption of the ordinance.
Id. at 435-36 n.1, 498 S.E.2d at 238 n.1.
40. 22 Mich. 104 (1870).
10511998]
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sumption that every member voted on each resolution on
roll call, the argument of the [town council] would be com-
plete, and we could say with legal certainty from this re-
cord that these resolutions were passed with the affirmative
vote of each of the members named as present in the clerk's
minutes of the meeting in question.
But surely there are no such presumptions of law, and if
there were, they would be contradictory to the common
experience of similar official bodies. It is very well known
that it is neither observed nor expected that when a legis-
lative body of any grade has commenced its daily session,
the doors will be closed to prevent the ingress of members
not prompt in arrival, or the egress of others who may have
occasion to leave. The actual attendance on such a body will
frequently be found to change materially from hour to hour,
so that a record that a vote was passed unanimously would
be very slight evidence that any particular member present
at the roll-call voted for it, or that any member not then
present did not ... Moreover, the members actually present
are usually allowed to vote or not to vote at their op-
tion, . . . and if the vote of a quorum is in favor of a reso-
lution and no vote is cast against it, the record may still be
that it was "adopted unanimously on call," though some of
the members present abstained from voting.4 1
The court in the Steckert decision clearly advocates the use of
roll call" voting by local legislative bodies,42 a position that
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Ford was not required to
adopt. Yet, the above-cited passage nevertheless served a dual
purpose. The passage not only emphasized the requirement for
recording the names of the members voting at the time when
the vote in question is being taken, but it also demonstrated
41. Ford, 255 Va. at 434, 498 S.E.2d at 237 (citing Steckert, 22 Mich. at 108-09)
(emphasis added). The Steckert decision has been cited with approval in many juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Nelson v. State ex rel. Axman, 83 So.2d 696, 698 (Fla. 1955); City
of Rome v. Reese, 91 S.E. 880, 881 (Ga. Ct. App. 1917); Pontiac v. Axford, 12 N.W.
914, 915 (Mich. 1882); Bruder v. Board of Educ., 224 N.W. 268, 270 (Minn. 1929);
Village of Beverly Hills v. Schulter, 130 S.W.2d 532, 537 (Mo. 1939); Monett Elec.
Light, Power & Ice Co. v. City of Monett, 186 F. 360, 368-69 (C.C.D. Mo. 1911);
Hand v. School Dist., 2 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Neb. 1942); Union Bank v. Commissioners
of Oxford, 25 S.E. 966, 968 (N.C. 1896); Picton v. City of Fargo, 88 N.W. 90, 96
(N.D. 1901); Board of Educ. v. Best, 39 N.E. 694, 697 (Ohio 1894); Shalersville Bd. of
Educ. v. Homer, 9 N.E.2d 918, 921-22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936); Finney v. Shannon, 6
P.2d 360, 362-63 (Wash. 1931).
42. See Steckert, 22 Mich. at 112-13.
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the fallacy of equating the term "unanimous" with the notion
that all members present voted for the proposition in ques-
tion-a fatal flaw in the Attorney General's opinion relied upon
by the Town of Marion. To that end, the supreme court merely
had to cite Black's Law Dictionary: "To say that a proposition
was adopted by a "unanimous" vote does not always mean that
every one present voted for the proposition."'
In applying the principles of the Steckert decision to the Ford
case, Justice Whiting stated:
Since there is no presumption that all members remained
in the meeting from the time it convened until the vote to
adopt the ordinance was taken, we cannot determine which
council members were present for the vote or who actually
voted to adopt the ordinance. Additionally, the recitation of
a unanimous vote does not necessarily indicate that all
council members present actually voted in favor of the
adoption of the ordinance."
Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia could not deter-
mine from the minutes of the town which members were pres-
ent at the time of the vote or, if present, whether those mem-
bers actually voted as opposed to abstaining or merely neglect-
ing to vote. Because this state of uncertainty as to the record
clearly violated section 7, the supreme court held that the zon-
ing ordinance in question was null and void.45
Ill. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 7
Thus far, the provisions of section 7 have been discussed only
within the context of the Ford decision. In that context, the
43. 255 Va. at 435, 498 S.E.2d at 238 (citing BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1523 (6th
ed. 1990)). The supreme court also cited PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PRO-
CEDURE FOR LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER GOVERNmENTAL BODIES § 516, at 201 (1975);
VIRGINIA SCHLOTZHAUER et. al., PARLIAMENTARY OPINIONS 91 (1982); J.R. Kemper,
Annotation, Abstention From Voting of Member of Municipal Council Present at Ses-
sion as Affecting Requisite Voting Majority, 63 A.L.R.3d 1072 (1975).
44. Ford, 255 Va. at 435, 498 S.E.2d at 238.
45. See id. at 435-36, 498 S.E.2d at 238 (citing McClintock v. Richlands Brick
Corp., 152 Va. 1, 24, 145 S.E. 425, 431 (1928) (holding that a municipal ordinance in
conflict with state constitution is void)).
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Supreme Court of Virginia chose not to "construe" the language
of this constitutional provision because it believed that its lan-
guage was plain and unambiguous.46 Yet, such plain language
was obviously misconstrued by the Attorney General's office in
its 1972 opinion. That opinion, in turn, was mistakenly relied
upon not only by the Town of Madison, but other jurisdictions,
as well.47 Indeed, the dissent in Ford argued that no constitu-
tional provision requires the contemporaneous recording of the
names of council members, much less, requires a "roll call"
vote.' Much of this confusion could have been avoided if the
Attorney General, in the first instance, had researched the
genesis of section 7.
Every state in the United States has some provision for keep-
ing a journal of legislative proceedings. Many of these provi-
sions follow the form set forth in Article I, Section 5 of the
United States Constitution which states in pertinent part:
"Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings... and
the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those present, be
entered on the Journal."
49
In his Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, Profes-
sor A.E. Dick Howard states:
It was not until 1851 that the Virginia Constitution pro-
vided for a journal of proceedings. That provision required
that each house keep a journal, published from time to
time, in which the yeas and nays on any question were to
be recorded at the request of one-fifth of those present.
Except for stylistic changes, this provision remained un-
changed until the revision of 1969.50
In analyzing legislative journals and constitutional provisions
relating to the enactment of laws or ordinances, it is important
to understand that the terms "yeas and nays" and "roll call"
vote are synonymous. According to Robert's Rules of Order:
46. See id. at 432, 498 S.E.2d at 236.
47. See supra notes 32-33 (discussing cases relying upon the 1972 Attorney
General's opinion).
48. See Ford, 255 Va. at 438, 488 S.E.2d at 240 (Compton, J., dissenting).
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
50. 1 HOWARD, supra note 34, at 516.
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Taking a vote by roll call (or by yeas or nays, as it is
also called) has the effect of placing on the record how each
member votes.... It is usually confined to representative
bodies, where the proceedings are published, since it en-
ables constituents to know how their representatives voted
on a certain measure.5'
Prior to 1972, Virginia was governed by the provisions of the
1902 version of the Constitution of Virginia. Similar to
Virginia's current constitution, the 1902 model required a jour-
nal for both the House and the Senate. This requirement was
embodied in former section 49 which stated that "Each house
shall keep a journal of its proceedings, which shall be published
from time to time, and the yeas and nays of the members of
either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of
those present, be entered on the journal." 2
Compare this language with the language previously cited in
the United States Constitution. In each case, when one-fifth of
the members present request it, a roll call will be taken to
record the votes of each member on any given question. In this
case, however, the term "any question" refers to resolutions or
procedural issues, not legislation.
The next section, section 50, described the procedures for
enacting legislation. Section 50 read, in pertinent part that
"[n]o bill shall become a law unless .... (d) A yea and nay
vote has been taken in each house, upon its final passage, the
names of the members voting for and against entered on the
journal."' Accordingly, whether one-fifth of the members de-
sired it or not, a yea and nay (or roll call) vote was always
required upon the final passage of any bill before it became
law. The same voting procedures were not applicable to
Virginia's towns, cities and counties. 4
51. HENRY M. ROBERT, THE Scowr, FORESMAN ROBERTS RULEs OF ORDER NEWLY
REVISED 353 (Sarah C. Robert ed., Scott, Foresman and Company 1981) (emphasis in
original); see also BLACI's LAW DICTIONARY 1618 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "yeas and
nays" as "[tihe affirmative and negative votes on a bill or measure before a legisla-
tive assembly. 'Calling the yeas and nays' is calling for the individual and oral vote
of each member, usually upon a call of the roll").
52. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 49 (repealed 1972).
53. Id. at art. IV, § 50.
54. One possible exception was section 123 of the constitution, which required a
10551998]
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In 1969, the Commission on Constitution Revision ("CCR"),
under the direction of Mills Godwin, Jr., Governor of Virginia,
and Executive Director, Professor A.E. Dick Howard, prepared a
report concerning a proposed revision of the Constitution of Vir-
ginia and delivered it to the General Assembly. In the introduc-
tion of the CCR Report, the Commission stated that "[sleveral
linguistic changes are proposed which conform related language
found in different parts of the Constitution. Again, the object is
clarity.... [Ihf no substantive change is meant to be effected
by a linguistic change, the commentary so indicates.""5
A perfect example of the "linguistic" changes introduced into
the new constitution can be found in the section dealing with
legislative journals. Former section 49 was kept relatively in-
tact, albeit under the new designation-article IV, section 10,
which states:
Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, which
shall be published from time to time. The vote of each
member voting in each house on any question shall, at the
desire of one-fifth of those present, be recorded in the jour-
nal. On the final vote on any bill.., the name of each
member voting in each house and how he voted shall be re-
corded in the journal.56
Article IV, section 10 of the 1972 constitution contains the
first mention of the now familiar phrase, "the name of each
member voting and how he voted."5 7 Professor Howard, in his
Commentaries, stated that "[t]he first two sentences of section
10, drawn from section 49 of the constitution of 1902, retain
the substance of that section; the changes made by the Com-
mission, such as substituting 'the vote of each member' for the
'yeas and nays of the member,' were stylistic."'
yea and nay vote to override a mayoral veto. See Gill v. Nickels, 197 Va. 123, 87
S.E.2d 806 (1955) (holding that requirements of section 123 were mandatory and self-
executing notwithstanding its variance with town charter).
55. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVIsION, H. Doe. No. 1
(1969).
56. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
57. Id.
58. 1 HOWARD, supra note 34, at 516. Note also that the original section 49 did
not refer to the method of recording the vote on the final passage of any bill. This
language is apparently taken from former section 50(d).
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Keeping with the Commission's policy regarding linguistic
changes, the "stylistic" changes in article IV, section 10, were
carried into other sections of the constitution. Accordingly, arti-
cle IV, section 11(d) (based upon former section 50(d)) now
states that a bill will not become law unless "upon its final
passage a vote has been taken thereon in each house, the name
of each member voting for and against recorded in the jour-
nal."5 9
Note that this provision does not include the language of
former section 50, which required that, "a yea and nay vote be
taken... in each house" because that requirement was
transferred to and included in article IV, section 10.6" Profes-
sor Howard explains:
Until the revision of 1969, Virginia's Constitution re-
quired, in section 50 (now Article IV, section 11), that the
name of each member voting and how he voted be recorded
upon final passage of a bill. Otherwise, no record of votes
taken on questions brought before one of the houses was
required unless, under section 49 (now Article IV, section
10), one-fifth of those present requested the vote be record-
ed. Section 10, however, goes beyond what was required in
section 49. In addition to requiring the names and votes of
members to be recorded upon final passage of a bill, section
10 requires that the final vote on any bill-those defeated
as well as those passed-be recorded.6
In light of the above, it is abundantly clear that the legisla-
tive journals of both houses of the General Assembly are re-
quired to record the "yeas and nays," notwithstanding the sty-
listic change of terminology to "the name of each member vot-
ing and how he voted."82 If it were otherwise, one would have
to assume that the framers of the 1972 constitution inten-
tionally reduced that degree of accountability owed by lawmak-
ers to their constituents. To the contrary, Professor Howard
59. VA. CONsT. art. IV, § 11(d).
60. See 1 HOWARD, supra note 34, at 516.
61. Id. at 518.
62. Id. at 516.
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declares that the journals are important because they "give
voters a means of scrutinizing the performance of their repre-
sentatives."'
Some dramatic changes in the 1972 constitution can be found
in article VII, which is entirely devoted to local governments."
Although most of these changes received little fanfare in 1971,
one provision, the second paragraph of section 7, has now made
its significance known. Section 7 states that "[o]n final vote on
any ordinance or resolution, the name of each member voting
and how he voted shall be recorded."65 As one reexamines its
language, it becomes readily apparent that the authors of the
constitutional revision intended that local legislators be held to
the same voting and recordation requirements as those imposed
upon members of the General Assembly. In commenting upon
this portion of section 7 Professor Howard stated:
[Section 7] requires the recording of names of members 6f a
governing body and how they voted on any final action
taken by that body. The requirement is identical to a provi-
sion in Article IV, section 10 requiring the General Assem-
bly to record members' votes when taking final action on
bills. By its express terms, section 7 applies to all ordinanc-
es and resolutions passed by a governing body ....
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Justice Compton's dissent in,
Ford argued that the Town of Marion had complied substan-
tially with section 7. He observed that when "a legislative body
performs its law-making function, courts must accord the legis-
lative action 'every reasonable presumption of validity."'6
While this is undoubtedly the case as a general proposition, the
rule does have exceptions. Again, Justice Cooley states it most
succinctly:
63. Id. at 517.
64. See generally, Jack Spain, Jr., The General Assembly and Local Government:
Legislating a Constitution 1969-70, 8 U. RICH L. REv. 387 (1974) (providing an over-
view on changes within the 1972 Constitution which are devoted to local govern-
ments).
65. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 7.
66. 2 HOWARD, supra note 34, at 847.
67. Town of Madison v. Ford, 255 Va. 429, 438, 498 S.E.2d 235, 239 (1992)
(Compton, J., dissenting) (citing Wise v. Bigger, 79 Va. 269, 281 (1884)).
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[W]henever it is acting in the apparent performance of legal
functions, every reasonable presumption is to be made in
favor of the action of a legislative body; it will not be pre-
sumed in any case, from the mere silence of the journals,
that either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded
a constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative
acts, unless where the constitution has expressly required
the journals to show the action taken, as, for instance,
where it requires the yeas and nays to be entered.'
In addition to, or perhaps independent of, the presumption of
regularity attending the actions of legislative bodies, the dissent
argued that "if the procedure connected with enactment of a
local ordinance is questioned, substantial compliance with con-
stitutional or statutory provisions regarding recording of
legislators' votes should be sufficient to validate the action." 9
The dissent then cites Hammon v. Dixon ° as authority-a
case in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas was asked to
determine the validity of a city ordinance that approved the
sale of a parcel of park land. Hammon, however, clearly is
distinguishable from the Ford decision. In Hammon, the parties
argued that the ordinance in question had not been properly
enacted because the yeas and nays of the aldermen had not
been recorded in violation of a state statute requiring such
recordation. Without going into any detail about the recordation
requirement, the Arkansas court merely noted that the minutes
of the council meeting recited that seven named aldermen were
present and one named alderman was absent. "In recording the
passage of the ordinance in question the minutes recited that
all the aldermen present voted in favor of it." 7 The Arkansas
court held that this recording was substantially compliant with
state law, the purpose of which was to make the position of
each alderman a matter of record.' One could argue that if
68. Tanner v. Premier Photo Serv., Inc., 125 S.E.2d 609, 615 (W. Va. 1962) (citing
Thomas M. Cooley, CONSTTUTIONAL LIMIATIONS 279 (8th ed. 1927)).
69. Ford, 253 Va. at 438, 498 S.E.2d at 240 (Compton, J., dissenting).
70. 338 S.W.2d 941 (Ark. 1960).
71. Id. at 943-44.
72. See id. at 944.
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Hammon had been litigated in Virginia, the ordinance would
have been upheld under the provisions of section 7.
IV. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE FORD DECISION
The Supreme Court of Virginia, through the Ford decision,
indicated that local ordinances enacted without compliance with
the mandates of section 7 are subject to being declared null and
void, even years after their enactment. The Ford decision also
implies that the names of the members voting on a particular
ordinance or resolution must be recorded along with their votes,
but the decision does not specify the manner in which those
votes are taken or how they are to be recorded. Must the vote
in question be a roll call vote in which each member casts his
vote separately as his name is read by the clerk? Or can the
legislation be passed by a voice vote? How must the vote be
recorded in the journal? These questions are not easily an-
swered by the Ford decision; yet, they are vitally impor-
tant-not just for those local legislators who are sitting current-
ly, but for those local officials who will be called upon to defend
the validity of ordinances which were enacted years before the
Ford decision." This section examines these and other ques-
tions which remain in the aftermath of Ford.
For purposes of analysis, it is helpful to draw upon the re-
cords introduced by the Town of Marion to pose a hypothetical
situation. Assume that all five members of the town council,
including the mayor, are present at the commencement of a
regularly scheduled meeting during which there is to be a vote
73. It should be noted- that the supreme court attempted to limit the effect of the
Ford decision. Whereas the town had requested that any adverse ruling not be made
retroactive, the court stated that "our decision today shall be limited to the present
case and shall operate prospectively only. Ordinances enacted prior to this decision
which were adopted with minutes containing the same deficiencies as the minutes
involved in this case shall not be affected." Ford, 255 Va. at 436, 498 S.E.2d at 238-
39 (citing City Council of Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Assocs. Partnership, 245 Va.
371, 378, 429 S.E.2d 225, 229 (1993)).
Ford, however, does not stand for the proposition that an ordinance which was
enacted in violation of the constitution may be immune from collateral attack just be-
cause another ordinance with a similar defect has been struck down already by a
court which desires that its ruling be prospective only. The language cited in the
Ford decision means that future litigators will have to attack any potentially defec-
tive ordinances in court on a case-by-case basis.
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on a particular zoning ordinance. Further, assume that after
the motion is made and seconded, each of the five members
present votes to enact the ordinance in question. Must the vote
be by roll call? Justice Compton, writing for the dissent in
Ford, appears to concede that a roll call vote is not necessary
when he declares "I would conclude, first, contrary to Ford's
argument, that the constitutional provision in issue does not
require a roll call vote, that is, a vote 'taken by yeas and
nays' . . 4
For its part, the majority only mentions the term "roll call
vote" once, and then only in passing reference to.the gist of the
Attorney General's opinion cited above. 5 Ford argued that a
roll call vote was required in her reading of section 7, but the
fact that the court decided in her favor does not establish the
validity of her interpretation. In short, the questibn remains
unanswered.
As defined earlier,76 a vote by "roll call" and a vote by the
"yeas and nays" are-for all practical purposes-the same thing.
Black's Law Dictionary defines the latter term as "[t]he affir-
mative and negative votes on a bill or measure before a legisla-
tive assembly. 'Calling the yeas and nays' is calling for the in-
dividual and oral vote of each member, usually upon a call of
the roll."
77
In Steckert v. City of East Saginaw,' Justice Cooley was
called upon to interpret a statute79 that required the City
Council to vote by taking the "yeas and nays" before enacting
certain resolutions and ordinances. A claim was made that the
resolution in question was not so enacted. The minutes of the
meeting at issue listed the names of the seven aldermen pres-
ent. The minutes further reflected that the motion to enact the
resolution was "[a]dopted unanimously on call."" The Supreme
74. Id. at 438, 498 S.E.2d at 240 (Compton, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 433, 498 S.E.2d at 257 (discussing 1972 Op. Va. Atty. Gen. 42
(1971)).
76. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
77. BLACICS LAW DICTIONARY 1616 (6th ed. 1990).
78. 22 Mich. 104, 106 (1870).
79. The statute in question was the Charter for the City of East Saginaw.
80. Steckert, 22 Mich. at 107.
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Court of Michigan invalidated the resolution. In doing so, Jus-
tice Cooley elaborated upon the virtues of roll call voting:
What is designed by this statute is, to fix upon each
member who takes part in the proceedings on these resolu-
tions, the precise share of responsibility which he ought to
bear, and that by such an unequivocal record that he shall
never be able to deny either his participation or the charac-
ter of his vote ... [The legislature has] imperatively re-
quired that there should be record evidence of a character
that should not be open to contradiction, or subject to dis-
pute; and their requirement cannot be complied with ac-
cording to its terms, nor satisfied in its spirit and purpose,
without entries in the minutes showing who voted on each
re'solution embraced by this section quoted from the charter,
and how the vote of each was cast. In other words, the ayes
and noes on each resolution must be entered at large on
the minutes, so that the presence or participation of any
member shall not be left to conjecture or inference."s
Justice Cooley's analysis of this subject is logical and replete
with common sense. Thus, it is no surprise many cases
throughout the country dealing with this subject matter cite
Justice Cooley's decision in Steckert with approval.82
One of these cases, Pickton v. City of Fargo," is illustrative.
In Pickton, the Supreme Court of North Dakota nullified a city
ordinance because of its non-compliance with a statute which
required that the '[y]eas and nays shall be taken upon the
passage of all ordinances . . .which shall be entered upon the
journal of its proceedings."' In Pickton, the relevant minutes
naned all eight aldermen present. The minutes further recited
that, upon its final passage, the roll was called with "eight
members voting '[y]ea."85 The court observed that- the statute
which controlled the enactment of such ordinances had two
81. Id. at 109-10 (emphasis added).
82. See, e.g., supra note 41.
83. 88 N.W. 90 (N.D. 1901).




components: (i) the taking of the yeas and nays in the vote
itself; and (ii) the recording of the same yeas and nays in the
journal.86 Other, often cited cases are in accord."
The Supreme Court of Virginia will be asked sometime in the
near future to determine whether section 7 requires both the
taking of a roll call vote as well as the recording of the same in
the journal (or minutes) of a local legislative body. Based upon
the legislative history of section 7, as well as the authorities
previously cited, the court would be justified in so finding. In-
deed, one Virginia court already has ruled accordingly." Until
such time as the question is put to rest, local governments
should consider the wisdom of taking final votes by roll call
and then recording the results into their minutes. In this man-
ner, those governments are assured that their ordinances can
withstand the type of collateral attack present in the Ford case.
Having said this, the inquiry is not complete. First, one
should appreciate the fact that the roll call vote method is time
consuming, especially because common sense and observation
tell us that many, if not most, issues that come before a town
council or similar body are decided unanimously and often with-
out much debate. Moreover, many local representatives are
citizen-legislators who have full employment outside. Unneces-
sarily lengthening council meetings should be avoided. Second,
assuming that the supre~ae court adopts a requirement of for-
mal roll call voting, what will happen to the myriad ordinances
which have bean enacted heretofore by less stringent proce-
dures?
In the previous hypothetical, five councilmen are preparing to
vote upon a zoning ordinance. In the first instance, the clerk
calls the names of each member and waits to record their indi-
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., People ex rel. Anderson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 71 N.E.2d 701
(IM. 1947) (refusing to speculate that the five council members recorded as present
were the same five persons casting positive votes); Village of Mettawa v. Carruthers,
530 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (listing five yeas, one nay and one absent could
not supplement the official record to show a roll call vote); Bennett v. City of
Emmetsburg, 115 N.W. 582 (Iowa 1908) (reciting the names of eight aldermen, and
eight votes "for" did not suffice where no indication that the vote was taken by yeas
and nays).
88. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 40 Va. Cir. 38, 40 (Fairfax County 1995).
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vidual, oral response-a traditional roll call vote that is then
recorded. In the second instance, the clerk asks for a show of
hands in favor of the ordinance and all five members raise
their hands. While their hands are raised, the clerk records the
votes of the individuals voting. Although this is not a tradition-
al call of the roll, is there any practical difference between the
two methods of voting, taking into consideration the policy
issues set forth by Justice Cooley? Going one step further, as
the vote is called for by voice vote, the clerk looks at the five
members as each of them says "aye" in unison. Because she has
known these members for years, she easily recognizes that each
of the five members has voted affirmatively and so she lists the
names of the five members in the "aye" column. Is there not a
record of the name of each member voting and how they voted
within the meaning of section 7?
In Brophy v. Hyatt,9 the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld
an ordinance in similar circumstances. Colorado law relating to
local ordinances required that "the yeas and nays shall be
called and recorded."" Under Colorado law, such a require-
ment was mandatory, and after citing with approval the
Steckert decision, the court recited the minutes of the meeting
and ruled as follows:
[T]he record of the board of trustees recites, respecting the
adoption of the ordinance we are considering, that "upon
the ballot being spread for its approval and adoption, the
votes stood as follows: Ayes, W.R. Neal, C.W. Givens, L.
Conley, George H. Shone, D.R. Smith, and William Sabine.
Noes none." We think this sufficient. The yeas and nays
were ascertained and recorded. This satisfied the essential
requirements of the statute. While the usual parliamentary
mode of taking such a vote is by a call of the roll, and was
doubtless contemplated by the law-maker, still it is not to
be regarded as essential. Any mode by which the vote of
each member is clearly and definitely ascertained for the
purposes of the record is sufficient.91
89. 15 P. 399 (Colo. 1887).
90. Id. at 401.
91. Id. at 341.
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The last sentence cited is probably the most common sense
approach to the entire question. In this instance, the form of
the vote is not elevated above the substance of the recordation.
Indeed, this result may have been foreshadowed by the Steckert
case when Justice Cooley opined that if the record in that case
had shown "precisely who voted for the resolution in question,"
the object of the statute would have been fulfilled, notwith-
standing the lack of literal compliance. 2
V. CONCLUSION
When the Constitution of Virginia was revised in 1971, one
of its goalg was to bring about linguistic clarity. In doing so, it
eliminated such archaic terms as the "yeas" and "nays." While
any effort to expunge "legalese" usually is worthwhile, in the
case of section 7, a problem is created: "the name of each per-
son voting and how he voted" appears too straightforward. Per-
haps this is why the Attorney General's office failed to see the
significance of its provisions. Unfortunately, the misconception
precipitated by the 1972 opinion of the Attorney General went
unchecked for more than twenty years.
Now, with the arrival of the Ford decision, those in local
governments who failed to appreciate the historic roots of this
constitutional provision will have their hands full as they at-
tempt to salvage old ordinances which now appear suspect. The
decision was extreme, but necessary. It did, however, leave
unanswered questions related to roll call voting. By examining
the legislative history of section 7, as well as the teachings of
Justice Cooley in the landmark decision, Steckert, the answers
to these questions can be found.
92. Steckert v. City of East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104, 108 (1870).
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